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Abstract 
 
To avoid a tie in voting, most boards have an odd number of directors. We argue that boards 
with an even number of directors are more likely to be weak monitors because of inefficient 
decision making and being captured by controlling shareholders. Consistent with this 
argument, we find that in China boards with an even number of directors have fewer 
meetings and are more likely to have board members absent from board meetings. Firms with 
an even number of directors have more tunnelling through intercorporate loans and related 
party transactions, lower financial reporting quality and higher incidence of accounting 
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irregularities. This evidence is stronger in firms with weaker external monitoring and for 
directors with weaker incentives to monitor. Finally, we show that firms with an even number 
of directors are associated with lower market valuation of equity. Our results suggest that 
corporate boards with an even number of directors in emerging markets are associated with 
more agency problems. 
 
JEL Classifications: G32; G34 
Key words: Board of directors; corporate governance; agency problems; monitoring; China 
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1. Introduction 
 A board of directors is expected to play a critical role in monitoring management and 
safeguarding minority shareholders‟ rights, in addition to advising top managers on important 
issues (Mace, 1986). Based on the idea that independent directors are better able to monitor 
executives, regulators around the world have stipulated that public firms must have a 
substantial percentage of independent directors on the board.
1
 Prior studies have documented 
that firm performance is related to various features on the independent directors, including 
the percentage of independent directors (Liang, Xu, and Jiraporn, 2013; Liu et al., 2015), 
board hierarchy (Zhu, Tucker, and Chan, 2016), female directors (Liu, Wei, and Xie, 2014; 
Luo, Xiang, and Huang, 2017), and foreign directors (Giannetti, Liao, and Yu, 2015).
2
 In this 
study, we extend this literature by examining an interesting feature of boards, namely, the 
odd versus even number of directors sitting on the board. We argue and find evidence that 
boards with an even number of directors (hereafter, even boards) are weaker monitors and are 
associated with more agency problems.  
 There are two reasons to believe that even boards are not effective monitors. First, 
boards usually make decisions by voting and it makes sense to have an odd number of 
directors to avoid a voting tie, and many management consultants strongly recommend 
boards have an odd number of directors.
3
 Even boards, therefore, are not efficient in making 
decisions, including decisions in monitoring managers and curbing agency problems. 
Consistent with this argument, Deng, Gao, and Liu (2012) find that firms with even boards 
                                                          
1
 For example, US firms are required to have a majority of directors to be independent, and Chinese firms must 
have at least one third of independent directors sitting on a board.  
2
 See Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) for a recent survey of the literature on boards of directors. Jiang 
and Kim (2015) provide an overview of the research on boards of directors in China. 
3
 For example, in an article in Fortune magazine, Carl Dorvil, CEO of Group Excellence Holdings and 
Managing Partner of VICAR Capital Advisors, suggests that one of the five rules for selecting a board of 
directors is to “have an odd number of board members”. He comments that “There‟s a high probability of a tie 
occurring if you have an even number of people helping you make a decision. However, there will always be a 
side, opinion or suggestion that wins out if you have an odd number of votes. If you don‟t have an odd number 
of board members, you are setting yourself up for a situation where you end up more confused than you started.” 
The full article is available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2014/07/16/five-rules-for-selecting-your-
personal-board-of-directors/#16dc05bf685f. 
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have lower Tobin‟s Q and operating performance. Similarly, Gao and Huang (2016) show 
that audit committees with an even number of members are associated with higher likelihood 
of financial restatements in the US.  
 Second, directors are often nominated and appointed by executives or controlling 
shareholders, the very people that independent directors are supposed to monitor and 
discipline.
4
 This raises the concern that the board of directors may be captured and thus fail to 
effectively perform a governance role (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Coles, Daniel, and 
Naveen, 2014). The issue of captured boards is particularly concerning in emerging markets 
where firms have concentrated ownership (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; 
Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000) and controlling shareholders usually handpick 
independent directors.
5
 We argue that an odd number of board members will be chosen if 
boards are expected to have discussions and dissenting opinions. In contrast, an even board is 
likely to result from the controlling shareholders‟ confidence that the board is under the full 
control of controlling shareholders and dissenting votes will never occur in board meetings. 
In short, even boards are likely to be captured and unable to constrain agency problems. 
 To examine the association between even boards and agency problems, we choose 
China as the setting for three reasons. First, in China almost every firm has controlling 
shareholders (Jiang and Kim, 2015) and controlling shareholders have almost full control in 
the selection of board members (Ma and Khanna, 2016). Second, due to the relatively weak 
investor protection in China, controlling shareholders have strong incentives to consume 
private benefits of control and expropriate minority investors through tunnelling (Jiang, Lee, 
and Yue, 2010), related party transactions and loan guarantees to controlling shareholders 
                                                          
4
 For example, Carl Icahn, an activist investor, asserts that “. . . members of the boards are cronies appointed by 
the very CEOs they‟re supposed to be watching” (Business Week Online, November 18, 2005).  
5
 For example, in China, a board chair who best represents the controlling shareholders and top management 
handpicks almost all the independent directors from his social network (Shen and Jia, 2004; Ma and Khanna, 
2016). The Shanghai Stock Exchange (2004) reports that 70% of independent directors are nominated by a 
firm‟s large shareholders. 
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(Beckman, Cole, and Fu, 2009; Peng, Wei, and Yang, 2011), and excessive consumption of 
perquisites or perks (Ang, Cole, and Lin, 2000; Du, 2014). This implies that controlling 
shareholders in China are more likely to choose a weak board or an even board that does not 
challenge their opinions and thus an even board is more likely to be associated with more 
severe agency problems. Third, as a presentative of emerging markets, China has many 
features that are common to other emerging markets, such as the presence of controlling 
shareholders in public firms and weak institutions to protect minority investors. This suggests 
that the evidence from China is likely to be generalizable to other emerging markets, and our 
study could inform a broad audience including investors, regulators and researchers who are 
interested in emerging markets.  
 Our data show that about 17.7% of boards of listed firms in China have an even 
number of directors in the sample period from 2004 to 2013. Examining board activities, we 
find that even boards have fewer board meetings than odd boards. In addition, members of an 
even board are more likely to be absent from board meetings. This evidence suggests that 
even boards do not work as diligently as odd boards in performing their roles in advising and 
monitoring. Furthermore, we find that even boards are associated with more tunnelling 
activities through intercorporate loans. After controlling for various firm characteristics, we 
show that intercorporate loans in firms with an even board are about 14% higher than the 
average intercorporate loans for firms with an odd board. Firms with even boards have more 
related party transactions, more guarantees for loans of controlling shareholders, and larger 
operating expenses likely associated with perquisite consumption by managers and directors. 
The results support our argument that even boards are weak boards that cannot constrain 
agency problems related to controlling shareholders.  
 We find the association between even boards and tunnelling is stronger in small firms 
and firms with few analysts following, consistent with the theory that agency problems 
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become more severe when information asymmetry is high. The association is weaker when 
board members have a larger share ownership in the firm, implying that share ownership can 
effectively motivate the directors to perform a proper monitoring and advising role (Vafeas, 
1999). We also find the association decreases with board size, suggesting that larger boards 
are less likely to be fully captured.  
 Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) argue that agency costs can lead to poor 
accounting quality because corporate insiders are likely to manage accounting numbers to 
camouflage their consumption of private benefits of control. Consistent with this argument, 
we find that firms with an even board are more likely to receive a modified audit opinion, 
implying a poorer quality of financial reporting. Furthermore, firms with an even board are 
more likely to commit accounting irregularities such as misstatements of accounting numbers 
and delayed or omitted disclosure of material information. The evidence suggests that even 
boards are associated with opaque financial disclosure.  
 Gompers et al. (2003) and Brown et al. (2006) argue and find evidence that firms with 
poor corporate governance and severe agency problems have lower valuation in equity 
market. Consistent with their evidence, we find that firms with even boards in China are 
associated with a lower market value of equity and a smaller Tobin‟s Q, after controlling for 
a number of firm characteristics. The results suggest that agency problems related to even 
boards are likely to result in investors‟ discounting the share prices and thus lower firm 
valuation. 
  While we argue that an even board is likely to be associated with more agency 
problems, we do not argue that an even board causes agency problems. Rather, we agree with 
many studies‟ argument that board structure and corporate decisions are jointly made by 
controlling shareholders and top managers (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 2002; Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen, 2008; Wintoki, Linck, and Netter, 2012). In our setting, we believe that 
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the controlling shareholders in Chinese firms choose even boards to maximize their 
consumption of private benefits of control. Therefore, even boards serve as a signal of 
captured and ineffective boards that fail to curb severe agency problems. One concern for our 
empirical results, however, is the possibility of omitted correlated variables that drive both 
the decisions of controlling shareholders to choose an even board and to exploit minority 
shareholders. We address this concern in two ways. First, we use propensity score matching 
to find a matched sample of firms with odd boards but similar to even board firms in other 
dimensions. We find firms with even boards exhibit more agency problems and poorer 
accounting quality, compared with matched firms. Second, we select a sub-sample of firms 
that experienced changes in the number of directors during our sample period and add firm-
fixed effects in multivariate regressions to control for unobservable firm characteristics. 
Firm-fixed effects allow us to focus on within-firm variations in agency problems associated 
with changes in the number of directors. The results from firm-fixed effects regression 
suggest that even boards are associated with more agency problems and higher incidence of 
accounting irregularities.  
 Our study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, our results show that boards 
of directors in emerging markets can be captured and fail to perform a governance role to 
protect minority shareholders since the directors are chosen by controlling shareholders. This 
echoes many investors‟ concern that co-opted boards may not be effective monitors. 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) argue that CEOs prefer to choose „sympathetic‟ new 
directors. Hwang and Kim (2009) find that CEOs like to appoint their friends who share 
similar views or social ties. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2014) find that co-opted boards are 
less likely to monitor. Ma and Khanna (2016) find that directors who are appointed by the 
current board chair are less likely to cast dissenting votes in board meetings, consistent with 
social reciprocity theory that appointees have an intention to return favor to their appointers. 
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Together with these studies, our study casts doubt on the degree to which boards of directors 
can effectively monitor and discipline managers.
 6
 Our results suggest that, despite regulatory 
efforts to install independent directors in board rooms in emerging markets, independent 
directors may be chosen by controlling shareholders to “window dress” the boardrooms to 
meet the regulations. To effectively protect minority shareholders‟ interest and constrain 
agency problems, regulators in emerging markets need to do more than requiring certain 
number or percentage of independent directors in boardrooms.  
 Second, we add to the growing literature on board structure. One stream of research 
examines the determinants of board structure (e.g., Boone et al., 2007; Coles, Daniel, and 
Naveen, 2008; Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2008). Another stream of research investigates the 
effects of board structure (for a review, see Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010). Unlike 
prior studies that focus on board size, we examine an interesting feature of boards and 
compare even boards with odd boards. In the setting of China, research on board structure 
also features a number of studies investigating board independence (Firth, Fung, and Rui, 
2007; Conyon and He, 2011; Liu et al., 2015), board hierarchy (Zhu, Tucker, and Chan, 
2016), female directors (Liu, Wei, and Xie, 2014; Luo, Xiang, and Huang, 2017), and foreign 
directors (Giannetti, Liao, and Yu, 2015). Some of these studies document a positive 
association between board features and firm performance, likely resulting from directors‟ 
advising role.  For example, Giannetti, Liao, and Yu (2015) show that directors with foreign 
experience are able to help Chinese firms improving productivity and overseas expansions, 
which contributes to firm performance. Our study adds to this literature by showing that 
boards with an even number of directors are not effective monitors.
7
  
                                                          
6
 Jiang, Wan, and Zhao (2016) argue that reputation concerns can motivate independent directors to cast 
dissenting votes to discipline managers. However, dissenting votes are rare, accounting for less than 1% of total 
votes, and usually are casted when independent directors‟ appointment is coming to an end (Ma and Khanna, 
2016).  
7
 We do not, however, recommend a prohibition of boards with an even number of directors. The fundamental 
reason why even boards do not effectively monitor is that the controlling shareholders select boards to maximize 
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2. Related Studies 
 As the largest and representative emerging market, China has attracted a number of 
studies that examine the development and various features of its financial markets (e.g., Allen, 
Qian, and Qian, 2005; Jiang and Kim, 2015). In the past two decades, China‟s financial 
markets have experienced explosive growth, with over 2,000 companies now listed on the 
main boards in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges and total market value of listed 
firms ranked second in the world. A key feature of Chinese firms is the presence of 
controlling shareholders. During China‟s transition from a planned economy to a market 
economy, a large number of state-owned enterprises became privatized and then listed on 
stock exchanges. These state-owned public firms account for about half of all the listed firms 
and the state still remains the largest and controlling shareholder. Non-state-owned firms, or 
private firms, in China are usually controlled by founders or founding families who own a 
substantial portion of shares to ensure their control of the firm. Jiang and Kim (2015) report 
that from 1998 to 2012 in an average listed firm in China the largest shareholder owns over 
one third of the shares of the firm, and the top five largest shareholders own more than half of 
the shares.  
 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Sheilfer (1999) argue that the presence of controlling 
shareholders could result in agency conflicts between the controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders. In particular, controlling shareholders can take advantage of their 
control of the firm and expropriate from minority shareholders through outright theft, 
intercorporate loans, loan guarantees for related companies, favorable transfer pricing to 
related parties, dilution of new shares, and other methods. Furthermore, due to the weak legal 
and judiciary system to protect minority investors‟ rights in China, controlling shareholders 
find the cost of expropriation is low, particularly in the early years when governance is weak. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
their private benefits of control. Without addressing this fundamental issue, merely requiring firms to have an 
odd number of directors will have little effect on reducing agency costs. 
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 Consistent with this view, many studies find that controlling shareholders in China 
appropriate firms‟ assets through tunnelling. Jiang, Lee, and Yue (2010) find that controlling 
shareholders siphon an enormous amount of money from listed firms through intercorporate 
loans that bear no interest or are not paid back on due dates. Tunnelling results in poor 
operating performance and financial distress for many firms. Cheung et al. (2009) show 
evidence of tunnelling through related party transactions including assets sales and 
acquisitions, trading of goods and services, transfer of cash and loan guarantees. While 
related party transactions are also used to prop up firms‟ performance, Cheung et al. (2009) 
find that there is more tunnelling than propping up. Cheung et al. (2006) and Peng, Wei, and 
Yang (2011) find that investors react negatively to the announcement of related party 
transactions that are likely to be tunnelling activities.  
 Being aware of these agency problems, Chinese regulators have introduced corporate 
governance codes that are similar to codes in developed markets. In particular, the “Code of 
Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China” was issued on January 2, 2002. The 
code outlines rules for controlling shareholders in Chapter 2 and rules for directors and 
boards of directors in Chapter 3.
8
 The code states that controlling shareholders shall nominate 
candidates for directors and that directors shall act in good faith, be diligent, be 
knowledgeable, and be law-abiding. In August 2001, the regulator issued the “Guidance 
Relating to the Establishment of Independent Director System in Listed Companies” which 
specified that board size should range between 5 and 19 directors and that at least one third of 
directors must be independent.
9
 The regulation on independent directors is motivated by the 
argument that independent directors are better able to monitor managers and insiders (Fama, 
1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). To maintain directors‟ independence, Chinese regulation 
                                                          
8
 An English version of the code is available at http://www.en8848.com.cn/hangye/law/chinaflfg/93523.html. 
See Jiang and Kim (2015) for a brief description of each chapter in the code.  
9
 Liu et al. (2015) provide a comparison of independent directors between China and the US. 
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requires that independent directors cannot own more than 1% of the listed firm‟s shares and 
cannot be one of the top 10 shareholders of the firm.  
 The controversy is whether independent directors and corporate boards actually play a 
role in constraining agency problems.
10
 The fact that tunnelling exists in so many Chinese 
firms despite all these firms having a board and independent directors probably suggests that 
boards and directors are not very effective in curbing tunnelling.
11
 It is also well-known and 
well-documented that majority of Chinese listed firms only have the minimum number of 
independent directors as stipulated by regulation (e.g., Jiang and Kim, 2015), implying that 
controlling shareholders do not have strong incentives to appoint more independent directors 
to monitor and constrain their consumption of private benefits of control.  
 Furthermore, since directors are nominated and effectively handpicked by controlling 
shareholders, it is unlikely that controlling shareholders will choose someone to challenge or 
confront themselves. Evidence from the US suggests that when CEOs are involved in 
selecting directors, they prefer grey directors with conflicts of interests over outside 
independent directors (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). Many corporate boards have 
independent directors who are friends of the CEO and these boards do not effectively monitor 
CEO performance (Hwang and Kim, 2009). When more board members are appointed by the 
current CEO, board monitoring decreases (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2014). Using voting 
data from Chinese firms, Ma and Khanna (2016) show that independent directors rarely cast 
dissenting votes. Dissenting votes account for less than 1% of total votes and none of the 
controlling shareholders‟ proposals have ever been rejected by boards in China.12  
                                                          
10
 See Jiang and Kim (2015) for a summary of the mixed findings on the relation between independent directors 
and firm performance in China. Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) discuss mixed evidence in the US and 
other countries.  
11
 A counter-argument is that tunnelling could be even worse if there were no independent directors and boards 
in China.  
12
 Conversation with some independent directors reveals that independent directors usually consult the 
controlling shareholders and get their consent before casting dissenting votes. 
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Following these studies, we suspect that some boards of Chinese firms are captured 
by controlling shareholders and fail to perform a monitoring role. We conjecture that boards 
with an even number of directors are more likely to be captured. The reason is that boards 
usually make decisions by voting, and to avoid voting ties a sensible choice of board size 
should be an odd number of directors. An odd number of directors ensure voting efficiency in 
the sense that a decision can be made at the end of the voting. In contrast, it is very possible 
that a board with an even number of directors can have draws in voting and no decision can 
be made. However, in our sample of Chinese firms, over 17% have even boards. We 
conjecture that these even boards are chosen because the controlling shareholders are 
confident that they have full control of the board so that voting ties will never happen in 
board meetings.  
 Finally, even boards are less efficient in making decisions given the potential conflicts 
resulting from voting ties. Deng, Gao, and Liu (2012) find that even boards in US firms are 
associated with lower Tobin‟s Q and operating performance, suggesting inefficient decision 
making in even boards. The inefficiency could impair boards‟ ability to curb agency 
problems and to monitor executives. Gao and Huang (2016) show that audit committees with 
an even number of members are associated with higher likelihood of financial restatements in 
the US, implying weak monitoring by teams with even numbers. The lower efficiency and 
weak monitoring associated with even boards are thus likely to lead to more agency problems.  
 Based on these arguments, we expect to find that even boards are weak boards and are 
associated with more agency problems in Chinese firms. We also expect even boards to be 
associated with lower financial reporting quality because insiders have incentives to manage 
accounting numbers to camouflage their expropriation of minority shareholders. The low 
financial reporting quality is likely to lead to more modified audit opinions and more 
accounting irregularities. 
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3. Research Design 
3.1 Measures of agency problems 
 We examine a number of measures of agency problems that have been adopted in 
studies on China. The first one is the other receivables scaled by total assets (ORECTA). 
Jiang, Lee, and Yue (2010) find that intercorporate loans between Chinese firms are typically 
reported as part of “other receivables” on the balance sheets of lending firms. The borrowing 
firms, usually also controlled by the controlling shareholders of the lending firms, do not 
have to pay back the interest or even the principal. These intercorporate loans enable 
controlling shareholders to siphon billions of cash assets or profits from listed firms and 
present one of the most brazen forms of corporate abuse. Jiang, Lee, and Yue (2010) show 
that companies with high ORECTA balances have poorer future operating performance and 
higher likelihood of financial distress. ORECTA thus provides a direct measure of tunnelling 
by controlling shareholders and has been used in a number of follow-up studies including Du 
(2014) and Qian and Yeung (2015), among many others. 
 Our second measure of agency problems is the amount of loan guarantee for large 
shareholders or their related parties scaled by total assets (GUARANTEE). Berkman, Cole, 
and Fu (2009) document that many Chinese listed companies pledge their assets as collaterals 
to guarantee the loan for a related party which typically is the controlling shareholder or an 
entity controlled by the controlling shareholder. The loan guarantees allow the related party 
to obtain loans at a lower cost. The guarantees also offer the related party an option to default 
on the loans and to have the listed companies pay back the loans. Berkman, Cole, and Fu 
(2009) show that loan guarantees are negatively associated with firm value and future 
performance, consistent with these guarantees representing a direct form of tunnelling and 
expropriation.  
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 The third measure is the total value of connected transactions with large shareholders 
or their related parties scaled by total assets (CONNECT). Peng, Wei, and Yang (2011) 
explore five types of connected transactions between listed firms and their controlling 
shareholders: asset acquisitions, asset sales, asset displacements, equity transfers, and cash 
payments. These connected transactions allow controlling shareholders to siphon the firm‟s 
assets or to prop up the firm‟s performance to avoid delisting. The market reacts negatively to 
announcements of connected transactions that are likely to be tunnelling activities. We obtain 
the value of connected transactions from firms‟ annual reports.  
 The fourth measure of agency problems is the expense ratio, calculated as the sum of 
administrative and sales expenses scaled by revenues (EXPENSES1) or the administrative 
expenses scaled by revenues (EXPENSES2).
13
 A common form of agency cost is the insiders‟ 
excessive consumption of perquisites, or perks. The perk consumption results in higher 
administrative and/or sales expenses (Ang, Cole, and Lin, 2000; Singh and Davidson 2003). 
Du (2013) uses the expense ratio to measure the agency costs between owners and managers 
in China. 
 To provide corroborating evidence, we consider the number of board meetings and 
directors‟ absence from board meetings. The intuition is that directors in a captured board do 
not have incentives to attend board meetings because they are appointed to “window dress” 
the board rather than to monitor the controlling shareholders or to advise management. At the 
same time, controlling shareholders of captured boards also have little incentive to hold board 
meetings to rigorously discuss corporate decisions. So we expect to find that even boards 
have fewer board meetings and have a higher likelihood of absence of directors in board 
meetings. For each firm, we calculate the natural log of the number of board meetings 
                                                          
13
 Using total assets as the scaler does not change our results.  
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(MEETING) in a year and create an indicator variable equal to 1 if some directors are absent 
from board meetings (ABSENCE) in a year.  
 We also expect the firms with more agency costs to have poor financial reporting 
quality because controlling shareholders may want to make their accounting disclosure 
opaque to camouflage the agency problems. To capture the quality of financial reporting, we 
use the following two measures. The first one is the probability of receiving a modified audit 
opinion (MAO). Auditors are more likely to issue a modified audit opinion if a firm‟s 
financial reporting is of lower quality and contains intentional or unintentional errors. The 
second measure is the probability of conducting accounting irregularities (IRREGULARITY) 
that breached the rules on corporate disclosure and has been identified and penalized by 
market regulators. These irregularities include misstatements of accounting numbers, delayed 
disclosures, failures to disclose material information, and inappropriate accounting treatments. 
A larger number of accounting irregularities indicate opaque financial disclosure. 
3.2 Regression models 
 In multivariate analyses, we estimate the following regression models: 
DEP = α+βEven + controls +ε                                                 (1) 
where DEP is the measure of agency problems or the measure of accounting quality, as 
described in the above sub-section. Even is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms that have 
an even number of directors on their board, and 0 for firms with an odd number of directors. 
We expect β to be positive in all regressions using measures of agency problems and 
accounting quality, suggesting that firms with an even board have more agency problems and 
lower financial reporting quality. 
 We include a number of control variables that are potentially related to firms‟ agency 
problems. Following Jiang, Lee, and Yue (2010), we control for firm size (Size, the natural 
log of total assets), profitability (ROA, net income scaled by total assets), state ownership 
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(SOE, an indicator variable for state-owned firms), large shareholders‟ ownership (Top1, the 
percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder) and regional market development 
(MKT, an index measuring regional development in financial intermediaries and legal 
enforcement). In addition, we control for other firm characteristics including market to book 
ratios (MTB, market value of equity divided by book value of equity), assets tangibility 
(Tangible, tangible assets scaled by total assets), institutional ownership (Institutions, 
percentage of shares owned by institutional investors), analysts following (Analysts, the 
natural log of the sum of 1 and the number of analysts following the firm), auditor quality 
(Big4, an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms with an international Big 4 auditor), and 
accounting losses (ST, an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms reporting losses in the past 
two consecutive years
14
), and ownership concentration (Top2_5, the percentage of shares 
owned by the second to the fifth largest shareholders).  
 We also control for other observable board characteristics including board size 
(Board_size, the natural log of the number of directors), board independence (Independence, 
the percentage of directors who are independent directors), share ownership by directors 
(Board_ownership, the percentage of shares owned by the directors), and CEO duality 
(CEO_duality, an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms whose CEO also serves as the chair 
of the board). Controlling these board characteristics helps us single out the effect of even 
boards on agency problems and accounting quality.
15
 Finally, we include industry- and year-
fixed effects in all regressions. In addition, we winsorize each continuous variable at the 1% 
and 99% levels to eliminate the influence of extreme values. 
3.3 Data and sample 
                                                          
14
 The regulations in China require firms to be delisted from stock exchanges if they report accounting losses for 
three years in a row. Firms reporting losses in the past two consecutive years have their stock name prefixed 
with “ST”, standing for “Special Treatment”, to warn investors that they have a high risk of being delisted.  
15
 There is mixed evidence on whether these board characteristics are associated with agency costs and firm 
performance. See Jiang and Kim (2015) for a review of the related studies.  
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 We collect financial data and board information for listed firms in China from the 
CSMAR database. Our sample period starts in 2004 because the regulation in 2003 required 
all listed firms to have at least one third of directors who were independent and Chinese firms‟ 
board size stabilized since then. The sample period ends in 2013 because in 2014 a large 
number of firms adjusted their boards in response to a new regulation that prohibited 
government officials from being directors. We require firms to have non-missing data to 
calculate the variables for the multivariate analyses. There are 13,572 firm-year observations 
in our final sample. 
 Table 1 reports the distribution of the sample across years and across industries. The 
number of observations grows over time, consistent with the growth in China‟s share market. 
The distribution across industries is largely consistent with that reported in other studies such 
as Du (2014).  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 Figure 1 shows the distribution of board size in China during our sample period. As 
required by regulations, the number of directors in Chinese firms ranges from 5 to 19. A 
majority of firms choose to have an odd number of directors, with 51.3% having nine 
directors. This is consistent with the idea that firms typically are aware of and try to avoid the 
problems of voting ties if the board has an even number of directors. However, 17.7% of 
firms have an even number of directors. Among the even number boards, eight is the most 
preferred number of directors, followed by 12, 10 and 6 directors.
16
  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Even boards and agency problems 
                                                          
16
 A small number of firm-years have 3 or 4 directors, likely due to the resignation of directors shortly before the 
fiscal year end and thus a gap between departing directors and newly elected directors. Excluding these firm-
year observations does not change our results. We select a sample of firms that always have an even (or odd) 
number of directors throughout our sample period. Using this sample of firms we redo our analyses and find 
results (untabulated) very similar to those reported in the tables. 
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 We begin with a univariate comparison between even boards and odd boards in Table 
2. The first few rows show that even boards have more agency problems than odd boards. For 
example, ORECTA, which measures tunnelling through intercorporate loans, has a mean of 
0.038 for even boards and 0.029 for odd boards. The difference in the mean, 0.009, is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Firms with even boards have more loan guarantees for 
large shareholders or their related parties (GUARANTEE), more connected transactions 
(CONNECT) and higher expenses ratios (EXPENSES1 and EXPENSES2), and have a higher 
likelihood of receiving a modified audit opinion (MAO) and engaging in accounting 
irregularities (IRREGULARITY). Even boards hold fewer meetings and have a higher 
likelihood of director absence from board meetings. The evidence from this univariate 
comparison supports our conjecture that even boards are captured and are associated with 
more agency problems. 
 Table 2 also reveals some differences in firm characteristics between even boards and 
odd boards. On average, firms with even boards have lower ROA, implying poorer operating 
performance possibly due to higher agency costs. Even boards seem to be more common in 
state-owned firms. The median number of directors is 8 for even boards and 9 for odd boards, 
consistent with the result in Figure 1. Even boards have a slightly higher percentage of 
independent directors, likely due to the regulatory requirement that a minimum one third of 
directors are independent.
17
  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 In Table 3, we examine whether even boards have fewer board meetings and more 
director absence from board meetings. In Model 1 where the dependent variable is MEETING, 
we find that Even has a negative and statistically significant coefficient (coefficient = -0.017, 
t-stat = -2.605). The estimated coefficient implies that, on average, even boards have 1 (≈ 
                                                          
17
 For example, to meet the regulatory requirement, a nine-member board must have at least three independent 
directors, or 33.3%. An eight-member board must also have three independent directors, resulting in 37.5% 
(=3/8) of directors being independent.  
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e
0.017
) fewer meetings in a year than odd boards. In Model 2 we use logistic regressions to 
estimate the probability that directors are absent from board meetings in a year. The result 
shows that Even has a positive and statistically significant coefficient (coefficient = 0.276, t-
stat = 3.677), suggesting that even boards are more likely to have directors absent from board 
meetings. Taken together, the results in Table 3 are consistent with our argument that even 
boards are likely to be weak monitors and their directors do not have strong incentives to hold 
or attend board meetings.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 For control variables, we find large firms and firms with high leverage ratios have 
more board meetings, possibly due to complex operations and high financial risk. Firms with 
high institutional ownership and more analysts following also have more board meetings, 
suggesting that institutional investors and analysts prefer firms with more board meetings.
18
 
Interestingly, we find a negative association between board meetings and the ownership of 
the largest shareholder. This negative association suggests that when the largest shareholders 
dominate there is less need to have board meetings.  
 Table 4 reports the results from regressions investigating the association between 
even boards and various measures of agency problems. Across all the models using different 
measures, we find consistent results that Even has positive and statistically significant 
coefficients, suggesting that firms with even boards have more agency problems. For 
example, in Model 1 where the dependent variable is ORECTA, the coefficient of Even is 
0.004, suggesting that firms with even boards have 13.8% more intercorporate loans than 
firms with an odd board.
19
 Results in Models 2 to 5 show that even boards are associated with 
                                                          
18
 This preference could arise because firms are required to release information following board meetings. 
Alternatively, institutional investors and analysts could exert pressure on boards to have more meetings. But 
institutions and analysts do not perform a monitoring role in China (Jiang, Lee, and Yue 2010; Jiang and Kim, 
2015). 
19
 13.8% is obtained by dividing the estimated coefficient (0.004) by the mean ORECTA of firms with odd 
boards (0.029, from Table 2). 
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more loan guarantees for large shareholders, more connected transactions, and higher 
expenses ratios. These results are obtained after we control for a large number of firm and 
board characteristics.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 Many control variables in Table 4 do not have consistent signs or statistical 
significance across models, making it difficult to draw conclusions. Exceptions are MKT and 
ST. MKT has negative coefficients in all models, suggesting fewer agency problems in 
regions with more developed intermediaries and stronger legal enforcement. This evidence is 
consistent with findings in Jiang, Lee, and Yue (2010) that tunnelling is more severe in less 
developed regions in China. ST has consistently positive coefficients in all models, implying 
that firms in financial distress have more agency problems.  
 We also expect that even boards are likely to be associated with poor accounting 
quality because controlling shareholders often manipulate accounting numbers to camouflage 
the agency problems. In Table 5 we use logistic regressions to examine whether firms with 
even boards are more likely to receive modified audit opinions (Model 1) and to commit 
accounting irregularities (Model 2). We find that Even has positive and statistically 
significant coefficients in both models, suggesting that firms with even boards have poorer 
accounting quality. This evidence is consistent with our conjecture. For control variables, we 
find a lower likelihood of a modified audit opinion and accounting irregularities for firms 
with low leverage ratios, higher ROA, higher institutional ownership, higher ownership by 
the largest shareholders, state ownership, and more analyst coverage. Firms with state 
ownership and firms located in more developed regions are less likely to receive a modified 
audit opinion or conduct accounting irregularities.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
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 In unreported results, we also explore other types of corporate irregularities that 
breach various rules and regulations, including irregularities involving insider trading and 
irregularities concerning corporate decisions. We do not find even boards are associated with 
these two types of irregularities. The evidence is consistent with the argument in Leuz, Nanda, 
and Wysocki (2003) that agency problems are likely to cause poor accounting quality and 
accounting-related irregularities.  
4.2 Effect of firm characteristics 
 After documenting that even boards are associated with more agency problems, we 
explore cross-sectional variations in this association. First, we examine the effect of 
information asymmetry. Higher information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders 
makes it harder for outsiders to observe and discipline insiders‟ expropriation activities and 
thus decreases the risk of insiders being punished for expropriating outsiders. This argument 
suggests that agency costs in firms with even boards are more severe for firms with high 
information asymmetry. We thus expect that the association between even boards and agency 
problems to be stronger in firms with high information asymmetry. Following prior literature, 
we use firm size and analysts following to measure the degree of information asymmetry, and 
expect to find even boards are associated with more agency problems, particularly in small 
firms and firms with a smaller number of analysts following. 
 Second, we consider the share ownership by directors. Vafeas (1999) suggests that 
share ownership aligns directors‟ incentives with minority shareholders‟ interests and 
motivates directors to work hard and to constrain agency problems. Following this argument, 
we expect to find the association between even boards and agency costs becomes weaker 
when directors have a higher ownership of the company‟s shares. 
 Lastly, we examine board size. The intuition is that larger boards are more difficult to 
be captured than small boards. Another reason is large boards usually represent multiple large 
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shareholders who could effectively monitor each other (Attig, El Ghoul, and Guedhami, 
2009). Wang, Xu, and Zhu (2004) find that a balance of power among large shareholders 
could lead to better firm performance. Following these studies, we expect the association 
between even boards and agency costs becomes weaker for firms with a larger board. 
 To test these cross-sectional predictions, we include interaction terms between Even 
and measures of information asymmetry, directors‟ share ownership, and board size, and re-
estimate the regressions. To save space, we only report the results from regressions using 
ORECTA as the dependent variable in Table 6, but results from regressions with other agency 
problem measures are similar and available on request.   
In all models, we find Even has positive coefficients, consistent with results in Table 4 
that even boards are associated with more agency problems. In Models 1 and 2, we find that 
the interaction terms between Even and Size and between Even and Analysts have negative 
coefficients, implying that the association between even boards and agency problems 
becomes weaker in firms with larger size and more analysts following. This evidence is 
consistent with our expectation that agency problems related to even boards will be more 
severe in small firms and firms with little analyst coverage where information asymmetry is 
higher.  
In Model 3, we find a negative and statistically coefficient for the interaction term 
between Even and Board_size. This result is consistent with our conjecture that large boards 
are more difficult to be captured and may have fewer agency problems due to the cross-
monitoring by multiple large shareholders. Results in Model 4 show that the interaction term 
between Even and Board_ownership has a negative and significant coefficient, implying 
share ownership may motivate directors to monitor and constrain agency problems.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
4.3 Endogeneity  
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 We have documented a robust association between even boards and various measures 
of agency problems and accounting quality. The evidence supports our conjecture that even 
boards are likely to be captured and unable to effectively monitor controlling shareholders. 
We, however, do not argue a causal relation between even boards and agency problems. 
Rather, we think an even board serves as a signal of agency problems within a firm. In the 
multivariate analyses, we control for a large number of firm and board characteristics in an 
attempt to single out the relation between even boards and agency problems. One concern for 
our tests is the possibility of omitted related variables that are related to both the decision of 
having an even board and expropriating minority shareholders. In other words, our results 
could change if these observable or unobservable related variables are included in the 
regressions.  
 We address this concern in two ways. First, we find a matched sample of firms that 
are similar to even board firms on several dimensions but have an odd number of directors. 
Specifically, we use propensity score matching to find a matched odd board firm for each 
even board firm. In the first stage, we estimate the probability of having even boards using a 
probit model with firm size, leverage ratios, board size and industry- and year-fixed effects as 
explanatory variables. We then select the odd board firms with the higher propensity score as 
the matched firm for the even board firms. In the second stage, we use the sample of even 
board firms and matched odd board firms to re-estimate Equation 1 using various measures of 
agency problems and accounting quality. The results from Stage 2 regressions are reported in 
Panel A in Table 7. The results show that our main results remain unchanged using this 
smaller sample of firms. Specifically, we find Even is negatively associated with MEETING, 
but positively associated with ABSENCE, implying even boards have fewer board meetings 
and more director absence from meetings. More importantly, we find Even is positively 
associated with ORECTA, MAO and IRREGULARITY, suggesting even boards have more 
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intercorporate loans and higher likelihood of receiving modified audit opinions and 
committing accounting irregularities.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 Second, we add firm-fixed effects to regressions to further control for any 
unobservable firm characteristics. Firm-fixed effect regressions examine within-firm 
variations and require some changes in board size over time. We thus select a smaller sample 
of firms that changed their board size from an odd number to an even number, or vice versa, 
during our sample period. Panel B in Table 7 reports the results from firm-fixed effect 
regressions. We find that Even is positively related to ORECTA, ABSENCE, and MAO, and 
negatively related to MEETING, consistent with results in Tables 3, 4 and 5. The relation 
between Even and IRREGULARITY becomes statistically insignificant, possibly due to the 
smaller sample size. Overall, the evidence in Tables 7 suggests that our results are unlikely to 
be explained by omitted correlated variables.  
4.4 Even boards and firm valuation  
 Prior studies argue and document that more agency problems and poor corporate 
governance lead to a lower valuation of the firms in the equity market (e.g., Gompers et al., 
2003; Brown and Caylor, 2006).  If even boards are associated with more agency problems, 
as we argued, we would predict a lower valuation for the equity of firms with an even number 
of directors. To test this prediction, we investigate whether even boards in year t-1 are related 
to lower firm valuation measured by the natural log of market value of equity (MV) and the 
ratio of the sum of market value of equity and book value of liabilities to total assets (Tobin‟s 
Q) in year t.
20
 Following Giannetti et al. (2015) and Zhu et al. (2016), we include a number of 
firm characteristics in multivariate regressions as control variables. To partially address the 
                                                          
20
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this test.  
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endogeneity issue, we also include the firm-fixed effects to focus on the time-series variations 
of firm valuations related to even boards. The results from regressions are reported in Table 8.  
 [Insert Table 8 about here] 
 The results show that Even is negatively related to both MV and Tobin’s Q, suggesting 
that even boards are associated with lower firm valuation. The estimates also suggest that the 
valuation effect of even boards is economic significant. For example, Even has a coefficient 
of -0.077 in Model 1 where the dependent variable is the natural log of market value of equity. 
The coefficient implies that market value of equity of firms with an even board is about 7.7% 
lower than firms with an odd board, ceteris paribus. Similarly, the coefficient of Even in 
Model 2 suggests that Tobin‟s Q of firms with even boards is on average 9.3% lower than 
firms with odd boards. The result in Table 9 thus provides further support to our argument 
that even boards are weak monitors and associated with more agency problems. 
5. Conclusions 
 In this study, we conjecture that firms with an even number of directors are likely to 
be captured and thus have more agency problems. This conjecture is based on the intuition 
that to avoid voting ties in board meetings, boards should have an odd number of directors. 
Even boards are likely to be selected when the controlling shareholders can dominate and do 
not expect any dissenting opinion to arise in board meetings. So even boards serve as a signal 
of the board being captured by the controlling shareholders. Furthermore, even boards are 
likely to be inefficient in decision making and monitoring due to the conflicts resulting from 
voting ties. 
 The empirical evidence from China supports our conjecture. We find that even boards 
have fewer board meetings and more director absence from board meetings, implying that 
even boards have less incentive to work hard to monitor executives. Furthermore, even 
boards are positively associated with various measures of agency problems, including 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
24 
 
intercorporate loans, loan guarantees for related parties, connected transactions, and 
excessive consumption of perks. We also find that firms with even boards are more likely to 
receive a modified audit opinion and commit accounting irregularities, suggesting controlling 
shareholders in even board firms aggressively manipulate accounting numbers to camouflage 
the agency problems. Finally, we show that firms with an even board are associated with a 
lower market value of equity. Our results are robust after we control for a large number of 
firm and board characteristics, use propensity score matched samples, and include firm-fixed 
effects in regressions. 
 Our results contribute to the literature in two ways. First, our study casts doubt on the 
effectiveness of boards of directors in monitoring and disciplining managers. By studying 
China, our evidence is particularly relevant to emerging markets where investor protection is 
weak and controlling shareholders dominate the appointment of both managers and directors. 
Despite various regulations on corporate governance, it is questionable to what extent the 
boards can be effective in protecting minority shareholders if minority shareholders cannot 
directly nominate and elect directors. Second, we add to the growing literature on the 
corporate governance and effectiveness of directors in emerging markets such as China. Our 
evidence suggests that boards may not be effective monitors when they are captured. The 
results imply that an even number of directors could be a simple and observable characteristic 
of captured boards. 
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Appendix 1: Variable definitions 
Variables Definitions 
Variable of interest  
Even 
An indicator variable that equals one if an even number of directors are on the board, 
and zero otherwise. 
Dependent variables  
ABSENCE An indicator variable that equals one if some directors have been absent from board 
meetings in the year, and zero otherwise. 
CONNECT The ratio of the total value of related party transactions with large shareholders or 
their related parties divided by total assets. 
EXPENSES1 The ratio of the sum of administrative and sales expenses divided by revenues. 
EXPENSES2 The ratio of the administrative expenses divided by revenues. 
GUARANTEE The ratio of the amount of loan guarantee (or collaterals) for large shareholders and 
their related parties divided by total assets. 
IRREGULARITY An indicator variable that equals one if a firm commits a financial disclosure related 
irregularity in the year at least once, and zero otherwise. 
MAO An indicator variable that equals one if a firm gets a modified audit opinion other than 
an unqualified audit opinion, and zero otherwise. 
MEETING The natural logarithm of the number of board meetings in the year. 
MV The natural logarithm of market value of equity at the end of year t. 
ORECTA The ratio of other receivables divided by total assets. 
Tobin’s Q The ratio of the sum of market value of equity and the book value of total liabilities 
divided by the book value of total assets at the end of year t. 
Independent variables  
Analysts 
The natural logarithm of the sum of one and the number of analyst following a firm in 
the year. 
Big4 
An indicator variable that equals one if a firm‟s external auditor belongs to a Big 4 
auditor, i.e., Deloitte & Touche (DT), PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), Ernst & 
Young (EY) and KPMG, and zero otherwise. 
Board_ownership The sum of the share percentage of all board directors. 
Board_size The number of board members. 
Business_segment 
The number of industries in which a focal firm operates in the year t-1, set to one if 
the information is missing, and set to five if the number if larger than five. 
CEO_duality 
An indicator variable that equals one if the CEO and the chair of the board are the 
same person, and zero otherwise. 
FCF The ratio of net operating cash flow divided by total assets in the year t-1. 
Independence 
The ratio of the number of independent directors divided by the number of total board 
members. 
Institutions The sum of the share percentage of all institutional investors at the end of year t-1. 
Leverage The ratio of total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. 
MKT 
Regional marketization index from Fan and Wang (2006) which measures the 
development of the intermediary agencies and legal enforcement in China. 
MTB The ratio of stock price to book value per share at the end of year t-1. 
ROA The ratio of net income divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. 
Size The natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of year t-1. 
SOE 
An indicator variable that equals one if a firm‟s ultimate controlling shareholder is the 
government, and zero otherwise. 
ST 
An indicator variable that equals one if a firm has reported accounting losses 
consecutively in the past two years, and zero otherwise. 
Stock_volatility The standard deviation of a focal firm‟s daily stock returns in the year t-1. 
Tangible The ratio of tangible assets divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
29 
 
Top1 The share percentage of the largest shareholder at the end of year t-1.  
Top2_5 
The sum of the share percentage of the second to fifth largest shareholders at the end 
of year t-1. 
Young_IPO 
An indicator variable that equals one if a firm has listed on the stock market for less 
than three years, and zero otherwise. 
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Table 1 Sample distribution by industry and year 
Industry name Industry code 
Year 
Total by industry 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Agribusiness A 15 19 16 16 16 19 21 32 36 34 224 
Mining B 42 43 39 31 33 37 40 48 54 52 419 
Food and drink C0 51 53 50 47 48 54 57 71 85 88 604 
Textile, clothing and fur C1 21 25 27 27 32 33 36 47 56 59 363 
Wood and furniture C2 5 5 6 5 6 8 8 10 13 14 80 
Papermaking and printing C3 15 17 16 18 20 23 27 30 34 38 238 
Petroleum, chemical and plastic C4 105 112 111 108 107 131 132 174 215 217 1,412 
Electronics C5 40 44 45 39 52 59 65 96 115 124 679 
Metal and nonmetallic industry C6 88 94 90 87 97 104 109 133 160 164 1,126 
Machinery, equipment and instrument C7 140 154 145 144 164 186 201 312 406 431 2,283 
Medicine and biological products C8 62 72 68 68 74 76 82 106 125 128 861 
Other manufacturing industries C9 4 3 3 4 7 8 7 8 11 12 67 
Public utilities D 62 68 65 61 57 58 62 71 77 77 658 
Construction E 27 26 25 26 26 33 34 40 55 56 348 
Transportation F 43 43 41 43 44 45 45 55 57 55 471 
Information technology G 58 61 58 56 62 72 90 132 175 186 950 
Wholesale, retail and trade H 94 98 97 94 93 96 96 115 128 126 1,037 
Real estate J 96 97 91 74 77 93 96 105 111 105 945 
Social service K 38 42 37 36 47 52 57 67 78 74 528 
Communication and culture L 21 20 18 16 18 21 20 29 36 36 235 
Conglomerate M 26 25 25 18 21 23 22 21 21 22 224 
Total by year 
 
1,053 1,121 1,073 1,018 1,101 1,231 1,307 1,702 2,048 2,098 13,752 
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
31 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics and univariate tests 
This table reports descriptive statistics for a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2004 to 2013. Firms are divided 
into subsamples based on whether they have an even number of directors. The last two columns compare the 
mean and median of the two subsamples. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-
tailed), respectively. 
Variables 
Even = 1 (N = 2,433)  Even = 0 (N = 11,319) Diff in 
Mean 
Diff in 
Median Mean Median S.D.  Mean Median S.D. 
ORECTA 0.038 0.013 0.071  0.029 0.011 0.056 0.009*** 0.002*** 
GUARANTEE 0.043 0.001 0.115  0.039 0.001 0.103 0.004** 0.000 
CONNECT 0.050 0.001 0.125  0.045 0.001 0.116 0.005* 0.000 
EXPENSES1 0.179 0.128 0.185  0.167 0.122 0.166 0.012*** 0.006*** 
EXPENSES2 0.116 0.079 0.148  0.104 0.074 0.128 0.012*** 0.005*** 
ABSENCE 0.122 0.000 0.328  0.088 0.000 0.283 0.034*** 0.000*** 
MEETING 2.215 2.197 0.325  2.239 2.197 0.327 -0.024*** 0.000*** 
MAO 0.070 0.000 0.255  0.052 0.000 0.222 0.018*** 0.000*** 
IRREGULARITY 0.134 0.000 0.341  0.119 0.000 0.324 0.015** 0.000** 
Size 21.45 21.320 1.109  21.440 21.330 1.060 0.010 -0.010 
Leverage 0.467 0.478 0.225  0.467 0.476 0.221 0.000 0.002 
Tangible 0.268 0.225 0.186  0.263 0.235 0.177 0.005 -0.010 
ROA 0.049 0.047 0.065  0.052 0.051 0.059 -0.003** -0.004*** 
MTB 2.325 1.777 1.633  2.295 1.811 1.493 0.030 -0.034 
Top1 0.363 0.336 0.158  0.367 0.348 0.154 -0.004 -0.012* 
Top2_5 0.155 0.128 0.115  0.158 0.137 0.113 -0.003 -0.009 
Board_size 8.936 8.000 2.224  9.125 9.000 1.749 -0.189*** -1.000*** 
Independence 0.372 0.375 0.058  0.360 0.333 0.048 0.012*** 0.042*** 
CEO_duality 0.178 0.000 0.383  0.177 0.000 0.381 0.001 0.000 
Board_ownership 0.059 0.000 0.147  0.068 0.000 0.158 -0.009 0.000 
SOE 0.532 1.000 0.499  0.495 0.000 0.500 0.037*** 1.000*** 
Institutions 0.062 0.024 0.103  0.062 0.028 0.096 0.000 -0.004** 
Analysts 1.184 1.099 1.162  1.239 1.099 1.146 -0.055*** 0.000*** 
Big4 0.042 0.000 0.201  0.034 0.000 0.182 0.008* 0.000* 
MKT 7.596 7.660 1.889  7.568 7.650 1.918 0.028 0.010 
ST 0.081 0.000 0.273  0.073 0.000 0.260 0.008 0.000 
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Table 3 Meeting activities of even boards 
This table reports results from regressions examining board activities using a sample of 13,752 firm-year 
observations in China. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. 
Variables 
MEETING ABSENCE 
Model 1 Model 2 
Even -0.017*** 0.276*** 
 
[-2.605] [3.677] 
Size 0.039*** 0.080* 
 
[10.137] [1.694] 
Leverage 0.140*** 0.292* 
 
[9.438] [1.655] 
Tangible -0.239*** -0.564*** 
 
[-13.667] [-2.688] 
ROA -0.091* -2.390*** 
 
[-1.758] [-4.278] 
MTB -0.001 0.061** 
 
[-0.433] [2.154] 
Top1 -0.056*** -0.975*** 
 
[-2.800] [-4.000] 
Top2_5 -0.005 0.041 
 
[-0.202] [0.127] 
Board_size -0.007*** 0.087*** 
 
[-4.156] [5.263] 
Independence 0.079 0.074 
 
[1.434] [0.106] 
CEO_duality 0.001 0.030 
 
[0.223] [0.324] 
Board_ownership 0.082*** -0.690* 
 
[4.269] [-1.771] 
SOE -0.046*** 0.106 
 
[-7.430] [1.460] 
Institutions 0.067** -0.144 
 
[2.521] [-0.465] 
Analysts 0.012*** -0.058 
 
[4.038] [-1.395] 
Big4 -0.005 -0.064 
 
[-0.375] [-0.404] 
MKT -0.001 0.005 
 
[-0.556] [0.275] 
ST 0.018 0.383*** 
 
[1.497] [3.168] 
Constant 1.380*** -5.987*** 
 
[15.653] [-5.622] 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
No. of observations 13,752 13,752 
F/Chi2 value 48.120 1004.250 
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.143 0.125 
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Table 4 Agency costs in firms with even boards 
This table reports results from regressions examining agency problems using a sample of 13,752 firm-year 
observations in China. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. 
Variables 
ORECTA GUARANTEE CONNECT EXPENSES1 EXPENSES2 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Even 0.004*** 0.005** 0.005* 0.008** 0.006* 
 
[3.435] [1.982] [1.727] [2.341] [1.944] 
Size -0.002*** 0.003** 0.002 -0.013*** -0.010*** 
 
[-2.822] [2.090] [1.386] [-6.831] [-6.453] 
Leverage 0.043*** -0.001 0.008 -0.052*** -0.024*** 
 
[12.693] [-0.231] [1.282] [-4.918] [-2.788] 
Tangible -0.051*** 0.005 0.011 -0.043*** -0.020** 
 
[-15.138] [0.893] [1.493] [-4.149] [-2.341] 
ROA -0.166*** -0.049** -0.087*** -0.524*** -0.456*** 
 
[-11.011] [-1.996] [-3.072] [-11.196] [-11.361] 
MTB 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 
 
[4.072] [4.395] [4.105] [9.534] [9.633] 
Top1 -0.027*** 0.069*** 0.071*** -0.110*** -0.086*** 
 
[-8.876] [9.617] [8.871] [-11.843] [-11.572] 
Top2_5 0.010** -0.035*** -0.036*** 0.002 -0.015 
 
[2.080] [-3.899] [-3.544] [0.132] [-1.228] 
Board_size -0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
[-5.259] [3.722] [3.374] [-3.031] [-2.953] 
Independence -0.024** -0.030 -0.033 -0.022 -0.009 
 
[-2.543] [-1.514] [-1.457] [-0.765] [-0.371] 
CEO_duality -0.001 -0.008*** -0.007*** 0.007* 0.002 
 
[-0.508] [-3.837] [-3.059] [1.959] [0.886] 
Board_ownership -0.003 -0.044*** -0.052*** -0.004 -0.018*** 
 
[-1.072] [-9.063] [-9.471] [-0.367] [-2.639] 
SOE -0.008*** 0.013*** 0.011*** -0.024*** -0.017*** 
 
[-7.020] [6.059] [4.671] [-7.418] [-6.446] 
Institutions -0.013*** 0.065*** 0.069*** 0.012 -0.004 
 
[-3.353] [4.860] [4.854] [1.065] [-0.516] 
Analysts -0.000 -0.003*** -0.004*** 0.003** -0.001 
 
[-0.223] [-3.289] [-3.477] [2.034] [-1.022] 
Big4 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.031*** 0.012*** 
 
[-0.048] [-0.019] [-0.425] [4.672] [2.604] 
MKT -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.002*** 
 
[-5.960] [-3.752] [-2.804] [-6.346] [-3.758] 
ST 0.027*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.077*** 0.069*** 
 
[8.323] [3.712] [3.376] [8.110] [8.531] 
Constant 0.126*** -0.052* -0.038 0.682*** 0.487*** 
 
[8.535] [-1.721] [-1.127] [13.612] [11.604] 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 13,752 13,752 13,752 13,752 13,752 
F value 44.585 25.832*** 26.275*** 74.800*** 46.573*** 
Adjusted R2 0.304 0.075 0.067 0.265 0.233 
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Table 5 Financial reporting quality of firms with even boards 
This table reports results from regressions examining financial reporting quality using a sample of 13,752 firm-
year observations in China. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. 
Variables 
MAO IRREGULARITY 
Model 1 Model 2 
Even 0.263** 0.205*** 
 
[2.463] [2.947] 
Size 0.211*** -0.022 
 
[3.018] [-0.537] 
Leverage 2.258*** 1.006*** 
 
[9.258] [6.445] 
Tangible -0.213 -0.205 
 
[-0.747] [-1.118] 
ROA -6.408*** -2.361*** 
 
[-9.982] [-4.833] 
MTB 0.225*** -0.039 
 
[5.973] [-1.517] 
Top1 -1.817*** -0.982*** 
 
[-5.153] [-4.697] 
Top2_5 -0.609 0.162 
 
[-1.320] [0.572] 
Board_size -0.026 0.027 
 
[-0.951] [1.525] 
Independence -1.277 -0.479 
 
[-1.200] [-0.787] 
CEO_duality -0.104 0.270*** 
 
[-0.760] [3.872] 
Board_ownership 0.034 0.594*** 
 
[0.059] [2.841] 
SOE -0.491*** -0.382*** 
 
[-4.922] [-5.872] 
Institutions -1.751*** -0.881** 
 
[-2.653] [-2.269] 
Analysts -0.718*** -0.172*** 
 
[-9.147] [-5.361] 
Big4 -0.060 -0.048 
 
[-0.224] [-0.282] 
MKT -0.043* -0.073*** 
 
[-1.722] [-5.034] 
ST 1.052*** 0.098 
 
[7.879] [0.857] 
Constant -7.594*** -1.554 
 
[-4.866] [-1.621] 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
No. of observations 13,752 13,752 
Chi2 value 1211.859 648.605 
Pseudo R2 0.318 0.060 
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Table 6 Effect of firm characteristics 
This table reports results from regressions examining the effect of firm characteristics on the association 
between even boards and agency problems. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. 
Variables 
ORECTA 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Even 0.081*** 0.009*** 0.024*** 0.005*** 
 
[2.832] [3.999] [4.217] [3.610] 
Even*Size -0.004*** 
   
 
[-2.751] 
   
Even*Analysts  -0.004*** 
  
  
[-4.088] 
  
Even*Board_size   -0.002***  
   [-3.797]  
Even*Board_ownership    -0.014** 
    [-2.466] 
Size -0.001* -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
[-1.779] [-2.725] [-2.869] [-2.841] 
Leverage 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 
[12.700] [12.674] [12.727] [12.700] 
Tangible -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** 
 
[-15.091] [-15.095] [-15.210] [-15.141] 
ROA -0.165*** -0.165*** -0.165*** -0.166*** 
 
[-10.998] [-11.001] [-10.985] [-11.013] 
MTB 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 
[4.098] [4.190] [4.033] [4.084] 
Top1 -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.028*** 
 
[-8.821] [-8.905] [-8.667] [-8.909] 
Top2_5 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 
 
[2.043] [2.015] [2.125] [2.088] 
Board_size -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
[-5.127] [-5.234] [-2.801] [-5.275] 
Independence -0.024** -0.023** -0.023** -0.024** 
 
[-2.481] [-2.377] [-2.454] [-2.513] 
CEO_duality -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 
[-0.476] [-0.464] [-0.440] [-0.478] 
Board_ownership -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 
 
[-1.082] [-1.079] [-1.026] [-0.244] 
SOE -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 
[-7.039] [-6.978] [-7.107] [-7.010] 
Institutions -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 
[-3.414] [-3.393] [-3.386] [-3.327] 
Analysts -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 
[-0.228] [1.286] [-0.353] [-0.203] 
Big4 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
[0.086] [0.037] [-0.074] [-0.048] 
MKT -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
[-6.074] [-6.034] [-6.074] [-5.977] 
ST 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 
 
[8.305] [8.276] [8.244] [8.312] 
Constant 0.112*** 0.123*** 0.121*** 0.126*** 
 
[7.326] [8.375] [8.219] [8.544] 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 13,752 13,752 13,752 13,752 
F value 43.660 43.722 43.774 43.807 
Adjusted R2 0.304 0.305 0.304 0.304 
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Table 7 Addressing endogeneity issues 
This table reports results from robustness tests addressing endogeneity issues. Panel A reports regression results 
from propensity score matched samples. For each even board firm, we match it with an odd board firm based on 
firm size, leverage ratio, board size, industry and year. The matched samples are used to re-estimate Equation 1. 
Panel B reports results from regression with firm-fixed effects using a smaller sample of firms that changed their 
board size from an odd number to an even number, or vice versa, during our sample period, to re-estimate 
Equation 1. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level (two-tailed), respectively. 
Panel A: Regressions using propensity score matched samples 
Variables 
ORECTA ABSENCE MEETING MAO IRREGULARITY 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Even 0.004** 0.182* -0.012 0.259* 0.175* 
 
[2.408] [1.757] [-1.365] [1.724] [1.920] 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 4,482 4,482 4,482 4,473 4,482 
F/Chi2 value 18.979 402.543 17.411 452.112 269.665 
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.347 0.144 0.141 0.330 0.074 
 
Panel B: Regressions with firm-fixed effects 
Variables 
ORECTA ABSENCE MEETING MAO IRREGULARITY 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Even 0.004** 0.468*** -0.018** 0.303* -0.013 
 
[2.519] [4.189] [-2.571] [1.773] [-0.123] 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 9,352 4,281 9,352 1,975 3,837 
F/Chi2 value 29.236 802.621 20.964 488.373 667.062 
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.448 0.193 0.407 0.289 0.165 
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Table 8 Firm value of firms with even boards 
This table reports results from regressions examining firm value using a sample of 13,744 firm-year 
observations in China. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. 
Variables MV Tobin’s Q 
Model 1 Model 2 
Even -0.077*** -0.093*** 
 
[-4.951] [-3.052] 
Size 0.559*** -0.617*** 
 
[52.570] [-29.667] 
Leverage -0.165*** 1.180*** 
 
[-3.257] [11.912] 
ROA 1.656*** 1.426*** 
 
[14.800] [6.512] 
Top1 -0.773*** -2.531*** 
 
[-9.894] [-16.543] 
Top2_5 -0.806*** -2.805*** 
 
[-8.727] [-15.530] 
Board_size -0.013** -0.008 
 
[-2.304] [-0.713] 
Independence 1.243*** 1.600*** 
 
[7.966] [5.239] 
CEO_duality 0.065*** 0.116*** 
 
[2.989] [2.739] 
Board_ownership 0.547*** 1.540*** 
 
[3.131] [4.501] 
SOE -0.204*** -0.292*** 
 
[-9.040] [-6.623] 
Business_segement -0.018*** -0.016 
 
[-2.955] [-1.382] 
FCF 0.217*** 0.200** 
 
[4.341] [2.048] 
Stock_volatility 3.715*** 6.495*** 
 
[15.230] [13.606] 
Young_I O -0.326*** -0.360*** 
 
[-15.147] [-8.550] 
Constant 9.928*** 15.616*** 
 
[42.411] [34.085] 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
No. of observations 13,744 13,744 
F value 360.486 111.791 
R2 0.321 0.128 
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Figure 1 Distribution of board size 
This figure shows the histogram of the number of directors on corporate boards in a sample of 13,752 firm-year 
observations in China from 2004 to 2013. 
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